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Abstract
Are immigrants a burden on host societies, because they receive benefits from, but do not
contribute to, the provision of public goods and services? Questions like these have shaped public
debate on immigration policy in the United States and Western Europe, and have fueled a large
body of research. In this paper, we investigate theoretically and empirically the implications of
immigration for the private provision of public goods. We do not find evidence that immigrants
free ride more than the native-born. Moreover, immigrants are less likely to receive assistance
from non-government sources compared to similar native-born households.
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1 Introduction
In August 1996, the Personal Responsibility andWork Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),
combined with the 1996 Immigration Reform Act, greatly reduced federal welfare eligibility for U.S.
immigrants. The policy reform as initially conceived had far reaching consequences for the ability
of immigrants to access public assistance and other federal entitlement programs. More than a
decade later, the locus of the policy debate on the costs and benefits of immigration for the public
sector has shifted —with more emphasis on the impact of immigration on key aspects of public
good provision including health care, education, and social services funded by state, local, and
non-profit institutions.
Are immigrants a burden on host societies, because they receive benefits from, but do not
contribute to the provision of public goods and services? Concerns about immigrants’ free riding
have grown as the proportion of foreign born in the U.S. population has risen, reaching 12 percent
- the highest level since 1930.1 Although there is extensive research on U.S. immigrants’ use of
means-tested welfare programs (Fix and Passel, 2002; Borjas, 2006; Hu, 1998) it is not known
whether immigrants free ride, or enjoy benefits from the voluntary contributions of others without
contributing to the provision of those benefits. Beyond the relevance of this question to current
policy debates, the extent to which households differ in their willingness to contribute to public
goods is of fundamental interest to economists and social scientists (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian,
1986; Roberts, 1984; Samuelson, 1954; Warr, 1982). 2
U.S. charitable organizations have gained visibility in the recent debate on immigration policy
because some researchers have argued that the services that charitable organizations provide to im-
migrants may have grown after welfare reform (Ku and Freilich, 2001; Hungerman, 2005).3Media
reports have highlighted the role of private, charitable, and faith-based groups in providing assis-
tance to immigrants.4 Moreover, the U.S. depends heavily on private contributions or on a mixture
1The concern that immigrants could place a burden on host societies is not a new one. During the colonial period,
immigration laws restricted the entry of non-citizens likely to become dependent on public charity. In 1645, the
Massachusetts enacted the earliest public charge laws. Immigration laws were strengthened in the early twentieth
century to allow the deportation of non-citizens who became a public burden.
2To date, much of the existing literature on contributions to public goods has emphasized the role of gender. For
example, Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall (2003) find strong evidence that men and women have different preferences
towards charitable contributions.
3Nonprofit charitable organizations are not legally required to verify immigration status, when they provide
assistance or when they receive voluntary contributions.
4”Bill on Illegal-Immigrant Aid Draws Fire,” New York Times, December 30, 2005, Section A, Page 24, Column
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of public and private contributions, perhaps more than in any other industrialized nation for the fi-
nancing of social services, health care, higher education, and disaster relief, and other public goods.
In 2006, nearly 90 percent of U.S. households gave money or volunteered time to the United Way,
the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, faith-based institutions, and many other charitable
causes, with total monetary contributions amounting to about 295 billion dollars, nearly 2.2 percent
of GDP (Source: Giving USA, 2006).
To address the question of whether immigrants free ride in their voluntary contributions be-
havior, this paper uses a new philanthropy supplement to the 2001 wave of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the September 2003 supplement of the Current Population Survey
(CPS). The new PSID data represent the largest one-time study of monetary and time contribu-
tions toward public good provision in the United States and also provide information on private
transfers to non-household members and the receipt of benefits from non-government organizations,
providing a comprehensive picture of transfer behavior. We use the CPS data to study time con-
tributions. Taken together, these data sources provide a unique opportunity to examine whether
immigrant and the native-born households differ in their likelihood of contributing toward public
good provision and of receiving assistance from non-government sources.
We do not find evidence that immigrants free ride more than the native-born. First, immigrant
households are significantly less likely to receive assistance from non-government sources compared
to similar native-born households. Second, immigrant status has no statistically significant impact
on both the likelihood and the level of monetary contributions toward public good provision. Third,
we find that though immigrant status has negative and significant impacts on incidence and level
of time contributions, the immigrant-native differences in time contributions tend to diminish over
time as immigrants acquire U.S. experience. Finally, we examine the behavior of second-generation
immigrants to study the long-term impact of immigration, and we find no significant differences
between the children of immigrants and third or higher generations of Americans in their volun-
tary contributions of money and time. Our results are robust to income and wealth controls and
alternative empirical specifications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the background of this
1 ”Illegal Immigrants: Are they Freebies or Freeloaders?” The San Diego Union Tribune, June 2 2006, ”The Gospel
vs. H.R. 4437,” New York Times March 3, 2006, Section A, Page 22, Column 1
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study, Section 3 presents an overview of the econometric methods used in this paper. Section 4
describes the data. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents the conclusions, and Section
7 is the mathematical appendix.
2 Conceptual Framework
The key question that we address in this section is why conceptually immigrants would differ from
the native-born in their willingness to free ride. We consider several potential explanations through
which immigrant status may affect voluntary contributions. The first channel that we explore is that
resource constraints differ across immigrants and the native-born inducing differences in voluntary
contributions to public goods. More specifically, we assume that immigrants have lower initial
wealth holdings compared to the native born, i.e., Ai0 < A
n
0 , where A
j
t stands for the household
j ’s wealth at time t.5 We examine the impact of lower initial wealth holdings on the voluntary
contributions of immigrants compared to similar native-born households.
A second channel through which immigrant status can impact voluntary contribution occurs
if immigrant households face different incentives to contribute to private transfer networks com-
prising of extended family members leading to them to free ride on the voluntary contributions of
the native born. Several researchers have noted the importance of private transfer networks and
coresidence among immigrant households (Becker and Toms, 1979; Glick and Van Hook, 2007). It
may be reasonable to assume that the extended family wealth holdings may be lower for immigrant
households. To investigate the role of household’s participation in private transfer networks on
contributions to public goods, we study private transfers to the extended family for immigrants
compared to similar natives.
We also consider a third channel if immigrants and the native-born
The household j’s utility function that serves as the basis for our analysis is defined as:
U(xjt , l
j
t , ; g
j
t , v
j
t ;Gt, Vt) + βUF (AF
j
t )
5j = i stands for the immigrant household, while j = n stands for the native household
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where 0 < β < 1, and U(xjt , l
j
t ; g
j
t , v
j
t ;Gt, Vt) and UF ( AF
j
t ) satisfy the typical assumptions
6 and
Inada Condition.
In the first part of the utility function, the household j’s own utility depends on private con-
sumption, xjt , leisure, l
j
t , the warm-glow effect of own monetary and time contributions (Andreoni,
1989), gjt and v
j
t , and the aggregate public monetary and time contributions to the community, Gt
and Vt.
Households face monetary and time constraints at each time t. We assume that the household j
can allocate income toward private consumption (xjt ), monetary contributions toward public good
provision (gjt ), private transfers to the extended family (e
j
t ), and savings (s
j
t ). Due to the tax
deduction associated with charitable giving, the cost of monetary contribution is 1 − τ , where τ
is the tax rate. In addition, each household has the same time endowment, L, and allocates it
across the following activities: work (njt ), leisure (l
j
t ), and voluntary time contributions (v
j
t ), i.e.
njt + l
j
t + v
j
t = L. The household j’s resource constraint is as follows:
A˙jt = wn
j
t + rA
j
t − xjt − (1− τ)gjt − ejt .
The second part of the utility function captures the household’s preference over the well-being of
the extended family, UF (AF
j
t ), which for simplification, is assumed to depend only on the extended
family’s wealth AF
j
t . We assume that transfers play an important role in the extended family’s
wealth accumulation process.
˙
AF
j
t = e
j
t
A closely related question is whether differences between immigrants and the native-born are
likely to persist over time. We turn to the theoretical model for insights on this question.
First, immigrant households provide lower monetary and time contributions than the native-
born due to their lower initial wealth. However, both the immigrants and the native-born increase
their monetary and time contributions over time. Moreover, the immigrant-native gap in mone-
tary(time) contributions diminishes over time if the rate at which the marginal utility of mone-
tary(time) contributions declines for immigrant households does not exceed a fixed multiple of the
6Utility functions are continuously differentiable, and increase at decreasing rates for each argument. In addition,
cross partials on utility functions are zeros.
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corresponding rate of decline for native-born households, where the multiple is pre-determined by
the initial wealth of both households.7
Second, as to private transfers, we note that if the utility on extended family’s wealth, UF (AF t)
satisfies that R′(A) > 0 and R′′(A) ≤ 0 on A ∈ R+, then the immigrant household has a higher level
of private transfers to extended family networks than the native-born household does. Moreover,
under certain conditions,8 private transfers decrease over time for both households over time, and
the immigrant-native gap in private transfers diminishes over time.
In the empirical work, we investigate immigrant-native differences in monetary and time contri-
butions. To examine the long-term impact of immigration, we turn to the children of immigrants
3 Empirical Specification
To study contributions and free riding behavior, we examine monetary and time contributions,
private transfers, as well as receipt of assistance for both immigrants and native-born households.9
Our framework is designed to incorporate the following features. First, household can contribute
money and time to public goods, and also to extended family members. Second, we account for the
fact that monetary and time contributions, as well as private transfers to extended family members
may be affected by the same unobservable factors -such as prices, generosity and altruism towards
others. We also observe a large proportion of households that do not contribute to charitable
organizations transfer behaviors. In other words, in our regression models, large proportions of the
dependent variables are zero (Table 1), thus OLS parameter estimators tend to be biased toward
zero. Given these features, multivariate probit and tobit models are appropriate for our study.
7More formally, A sufficient condition for diminishing immigrant-native gap in monetary(time) contributions is
that
Ugnt g
n
t
−U
gitg
i
t
UGtGt
≥ 2(1− λi0
λn0
) or Ugitgit >
λi0
λn0
Ugnt gnt ,
“Uvnt vnt −Uvitvit
UVtVt
≥ 2(1− λi0
λn0
) or Uvitvit >
λi0
λn0
Uvnt vnt ,
”
∀t ≥ 0. Refer
to the Appendix for more details.
8More formally, A sufficient condition for diminishing immigrant-native gap in private transfers over time is that
R′(A) ≥ 0 and R′′(A) < 0 or that R′(A) > 0 and R′′(A) ≤ 0 on A ∈ R+.
9We define monetary and time contributions as contribution behavior, and monetary contributions and private
transfers as transfer behavior. Here monetary contributions belong to both behaviors.
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3.1 Multivariate Probit Model
The general formulation is given in terms of a 3-function system as follows:
Y ∗ = X ′β + e (1)
Y ∗ =

Y ∗M
Y ∗P
Y ∗T
 , X ′ =

X ′M 0 0
0 X ′P 0
0 0 X ′T
 , β =

βM
βP
βT
 , e =

eM
eP
eT
 .
Y ∗ is a vector of latent variables, with Y ∗M for monetary contributions, Y
∗
P for private transfers,
and Y ∗T for time contributions. XM , XP , and XT are vectors of household characteristics which
have real explanatory power to monetary contributions, private transfers, and time contributions,
respectively. Here we assume XM = XP = XT = X = (1, I, duration ∗ I,X)10, where I is an
indicator of immigrant status, duration captures the duration effect, and X represents a vector of
all other characteristics including head’s age, sex, marital status, etc;11 β is a vector of coefficients;
e is a vector of error terms following a multivariate normal distribution, that is,
e ∼ N(0,Ω) Ω =

1 ρM,P ρM,T
ρP,M 1 ρP,T
ρT,M ρT,P 1

We do not observe the vector of latent variables Y ∗, but only the choice made by the household
Y = (YM , YP , YT )′. The relationship between latent and observed variables can be represented by
Yc =
 1 if Y
∗
c > 0
0 otherwise
c =M,P, T
The joint probability of YM,i = m, YP,i = p, and YT,i = t (m,p,t=0 or 1) for household i is given
10That is, we have the same explanatory variables in regressions of monetary contributions, private transfers, and
time contributions.
11To control for community-level variables, we include state-fixed effects in all specifications.
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by
P (m, p, t|Xi) =
∫ S(m)X′iβM
−∞
∫ S(p)X′iβP
−∞
∫ S(t)X′iβT
−∞
φ(eM,i, eP,i, eT,i; Ω)deM,ideP,ideT,i, m, p, t = 0or1
where
S(c) =
 1 if c = 1−1 if c = 0 where c = m, p, t
and φ(eM,i, eP,i, eT,i; Ω) is the density function of the trivariate normal distribution of e. For
example, the conditional probability for household i make time contributions, but no monetary
contribution and private transfer (m = 0, p = 0, t = 1) is
P (0, 0, 1|Xi) =
∫ −X′iβM
−∞
∫ −X′iβP
−∞
∫ X′iβT
−∞
φ(eM,i, eP,i, eT,i; Ω)deM,ideP,ideT,i.
The individual log-likelihood function for household i is
logli(β,Ω) =
1∑
m=0
1∑
p=0
1∑
t=0
Ii(m, p, t) log[P (m, p, t|Xi)]
where
Ii(m, p, t) =
 1 if Y
M
i = m,Y
P
i = p, and Y
T
i = t
0 otherwise
(m, p, t = 0or1)
The evaluation of multivariate normal integral is not forbidable in most software packages. After
evaluating each individual log-likelihood, we simply sum it across households to get the aggregate
log-likelihood. Finally, The ML estimators in the multivariate probit model βML are defined as
βML = argmax
β
logL(β,ΩML) = argmax
β
N∑
i=1
logli(β,ΩML)
3.2 Multivariate Tobit Model
The settings in the multivariate tobit model are identical to those in the multivariate probit model,
except for the vector of latent variables, which in the multivariate tobit model is defined as follows:
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Y =

YM
YP
YT
 where Yc =
 Y
∗
c if Y
∗
c > 0
0 otherwise
c =M,P, T
In general, the individual likelihood function for a multivariate tobit model is a multiple integral
of the probability density function of the vector of error terms. The density function is integrated to
all the error terms, with respect to which the dependent variables take values on censoring points.
In mathematics language, the individual likelihood function for household i is
li(β,Ω) =
∫ −X′iβM
−∞
φ
(
eM,i, eP,i, eT,i; Ω
)
deM,i =
∫ −X′iβM
−∞
φ
(
eM,i, (YP,i−X ′iβP ), (YT,i−X ′iβT ); Ω
)
deM,i
if YM,i = 0, YP,i > 0, YT,i > 0
We take two extreme cases as examples. First, if the values of the 3 dependent variables are
all positive (YM,i > 0, YP,i > 0, YT,i > 0), then the individual likelihood function is simply the
probability density function of the trivariate normal distribution, N(0,Ω):
li(β,Ω) = φ(eM,i, eP,i, eT,i; Ω) = φ(YM,i −X ′iβM , YP,i −X ′iβP , YT,i −X ′iβT ; Ω)
The other extreme case is with YM,i = 0, YP,i = 0, YT,i = 0. That is, household i does not have any
contribution or transfer behavior. In this case, the individual likelihood is a triple integral:
li(β,Ω) =
∫ −X′iβM
−∞
∫ −X′iβP
−∞
∫ −X′iβT
−∞
φ
(
eM,i, eP,i, eT,i; Ω
)
deM,ideP,idT,i
The rest process is quite similar to that in the probit model. After evaluating each individual
likelihood, we take log of it, and sum it across households to get the aggregate log-likelihood.
Finally, the ML estimators in the multivariate tobit model βML are defined as
βML = argmax
β
logL(β,ΩML) = argmax
β
N∑
i=1
logli(β,ΩML)
Finally, we examine how immigrant status affects the incidence of receipt of benefits from non-
government sources and how the immigrant-native comparison evolves as immigrants gain U.S.
8
experience. The empirical probit model for receipt of assistance from non-government sources is
specified as follow:
Receiptofbenefiti = β0 + β1Ii + β2(Durationi ∗ Ii) + β3Xi + eB,i. (2)
4 Overview of Data Resources
The data on monetary contributions are drawn from a new module of the 2001 wave of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The new 2001 PSID module used in this study is unique
because it provides high-quality data on voluntary contributions toward public good provision
comparable to the U.S. Individual Taxpayer Return data (Wilhelm, 2006).12 One challenge for
any study of voluntary contributions is the need to fully control for household resources. The
PSID contains unusually detailed information on income and wealth, which are typically unavailable
within existing data sets on voluntary contributions, allowing us to take into account the household’s
economic position. Moreover, the PSID provides detailed information on the incidence and levels
of private transfers within extended family, and on the incidence of receipt of assistance from
non-government sources, including churches, community groups, and families.
Monetary contributions are prevalent in the PSID. Nearly 64% of households contribute money,
however only 20% contribute time. Because the mean incidence of volunteering is generally lower,
we also examine the 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS) to study voluntary time contributions.
The large samples sizes of immigrant and native-born households in the CPS (5773 immigrant
households and 50,538 native-born households) allow us to compare results across the two surveys,
which serves as an important robustness check.13 However, the CPS has some disadvantages
because it provides much less information on income and wealth.
12The PSID philanthropy module is the only data set on giving comparable to the IRS taxpayer data in coverage.
However, we should note that the IRS taxpayer database provides a more accurate picture of charitable giving at and
above the 90th percentile of charitable giving. The IRS tax data is less suitable for this study because immigrant
status and experience is not recorded, and immigrants may be less likely to itemize their deductions.
13We also note some differences across the two surveys. The longitudinal nature of the PSID means that recent
immigrants that arrived in the U.S. within the last 10 years make up a smaller share of the immigrant sample (16
percent of the PSID immigrant sample is composed of recent arrivals compared to 28 percent for the CPS).
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4.1 Immigrant-Native Differences in Transfer and Contribution Behaviors
Table 1 provides summary statistics from the PSID on monetary contributions to public good
provision, private transfers to extended family, as well as time contributions.14 Immigrant house-
holds15 have a lower incidence of monetary contributions compared to native-born households (43
percent of immigrants versus 66 percent for the native-born population contribute money to char-
itable organizations). Conditional on positive monetary contributions, immigrant households also
have lower mean levels of monetary contribution to charitable organizations compared to native-
born households. The average monetary contribution level for immigrants is $1243.19 compared to
$1918.34 for native-born households. As to private transfers, we find that on average, immigrant
households have a higher rate of participation in private transfer networks compared to native-born
households. 16 About 18 percent of immigrant households reported sending private transfers com-
pared to 10 percent of native-born households. However, conditional on participating in private
transfer networks, immigrant households have lower mean levels of private transfers compared to
the native-born. Among those households that participate in private transfer networks, the mean
private transfer to non household members is $3025.06 for immigrants and $5117.53 for the native-
born. Similar to monetary contributions, statistics on time contributions from both PSID(Table 1)
and CPS(Table 2) show that native households are more likely to participate in time contributions,
and that conditional on positive time contributions, native households have larger mean amount of
time contributions.
In sum, according to the summary statistics, immigrant households, compared with native
households, have lower incidences and lower amounts of monetary and time contributions, and
have higher incidences but lower amounts of private transfers.
14Our key dependent variable on monetary contributions was constructed using the following questions, which was
posed to PSID survey respondents: During the year 2000, did you or anyone in your family donate money, assets, or
property with a combined value of more than $25 to religious or charitable organizations?
15Immigrant households refer to households where either the head or spouse was born outside the United States.
16In 2005, U.S. immigrants sent $40 billion to their origin families in Latin America and the Caribbean, according
to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). According to the World Bank, global remittances amounted to
$232 billion in 2005.
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4.2 Immigrant-Native Differences in Receipt of Assistance From Non-government
Sources
An important issue that has been raised in recent debates on immigration policy and welfare reform
is whether immigrants rely on benefits from non-government sources-health care, education and
other social services because they face restrictions in accessing government benefits, particularly
at the federal level. The PSID provides information on the extent to which households, whether
immigrant or native-born, receive assistance from non-government sources-specifically churches and
community organizations that provide assistance for needy. In the PSID, households were asked the
type of help received in the past two years from non-government sources. For example, households
provided information on assistance received in the form of housing, child care, transportation,
clothing, health care, job training, and so on. The data available in the PSID covers benefits
received over a two-year period. About 2.5 percent of the sample reports receiving assistance
from non-government sources. Table 1 indicates that on average, immigrants are less likely than
native-born households to receive assistance from non-government sources (2 percent of immigrant
households compared to 3 percent of native-born households report receiving assistance).
4.3 Immigrant-Native Differences in Household Characteristics
One key factor that we consider is the role of wealth and income differences in explaining the gap in
voluntary contributions among immigrant and native-born households. To this end, we construct a
measure of permanent income using the PSID in order to capture a household’s economic position,
as this factor has been shown to have a larger effect on transfer behavior than transitory income
(Auten, Holger-Sieg, & Clotfelter, 2002).17 Mean permanent household income is lower among
immigrant households compared to native-born households (mean permanent income is $42631
for immigrants compared to $62063 for native-born households). The average wealth holdings
and average yearly income of immigrant households are also considerably lower compared to the
native-born households.
An additional insight from the theoretical model is that variation in extended family resources
17Our measure of permanent income is based on average family income from 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves of the
PSID. Total family income can contain negative values. The number of households with negative numbers for those
variables is relatively small, and we replace these negative values with missing values.
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can induce differences in the transfer behavior of immigrant compared to native-born households.
We do not have a direct measure of extended family resources. However, to capture extended
family’s circumstances, we use a proxy variable—the household head father’s education. We find
striking differences in the educational attainment of extended family members among immigrant
and native-born households. Specifically, while 96 percent of heads’ fathers for immigrant house-
holds have not completed high school, only 36 percent for heads’ fathers for native-born households
have not completed high school.
Finally, we should note that there are important differences in summary household character-
istics between immigrant and native-born households in both PSID(Table 1) and CPS(Table 2).
In particular, the heads of immigrant households tend to be younger, more likely to be married,
non-white, and tend to have lower levels of educational attainment. Heads of immigrant households
are also more likely to be unemployed, suggesting that immigrants tend to be more economically
vulnerable than native-born household heads.
4.4 Second and Higher Generation Households
Table 1 also provides summary information for second-generation and higher-generation house-
holds.18 We note that second-generation households comprise about 10 percent of the native-born
households in both the PSID and CPS . In PSID by comparing the Columns 1 and 3 in Table
1, we find that in contrast to immigrant households, second generation households have higher
incidence and levels of monetary and time contributions, but lower incidence and levels of pri-
vate transfers and receipt of assistance. On the other hand, we find that the transfer behavior of
second-generations is very similar to that of higher generations of the native-born. Interestingly,
second-generation immigrants have higher mean levels of education, income, and wealth compared
to third or higher generations. In addition the extended family’s educational attainment of second
generation households are comparable to that of third or higher generation households. We present
summary statistics in time contributions and household characteristics for second generation house-
holds from the CPS in Table 2.
18Second generation households are defined as households where the head has at least one parent who is an
immigrant.
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5 Results and Discussion
5.1 The Impact of Immigrant Status on Transfer and Contribution Behaviors
-Results from Baseline Univariate and Trivariate Models
We now turn to discuss main results from the baseline univariate and trivariate regression analysis
on the impacts of immigrant status on monetary contributions, private transfers, and time con-
tributions. Table 3 (Row A in Panels I and II) presents results from the baseline univariate and
trivariate Probit and Tobit regressions on monetary contributions. The estimates in all regressions
in Table 3 include controls for socio-demographic variables, the price of giving, and log permanent
income.19 We also report marginal effects (calculated at the variable means) for the univariate
probit and Tobit estimates.
Results from both univariate and trivariate Probit models show that immigrant status has
no significant impact on the likelihood of monetary contributions. Moreover, from the marginal
effect in the univariate model, we find that immigrant status reduces the likelihood of monetary
contributions by only 0.5 percentage point, and it is insignificant. Similarly, The univariate and
trivariate Tobit specifications on monetary contribution levels show that immigrant status has no
significant effect on the level of monetary contributions to charitable organizations.
In Table 3 (Row B in Panels I and II), we present results for private transfers to non-household
members. In contrast to the results on monetary contributions, immigrant households appear
more likely than similar native-born households to participate in private transfer networks, even
after we have controlled for economic and demographic variables; In both univariate and trivariate
models, the impact of immigrant status on probability of private transfers is significant. Starting
at the mean, we find that immigrants are 7.3 percentage points more likely to give private transfers
to non-household members compared to similar native-born households, holding other variables
constant.
More interestingly, from univariate and trivariate models, we get quite different results on the
impact of immigrant status on levels of private transfers, which is highly significant(at 1% level)
in the univariate model, but insignificant(even at 10% level) in the trivariate model. We attribute
19The control variables in our analysis are age, age squared, education, gender, marital status, nonwhite, Catholic,
family size, log permanent income, unemployment and region dummies. For dichotomous variables, the results
represent the change in the probability and the percentage change in level of contributions associated with a change
in the indicator variable from zero to one.
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this discrepancy to the different treatments of error terms in univariate and trivariate models.
In univariate models, the unobservable factors in the error term are uncontrolled, so correlation
between immigrant status and unobservable factors causes bias in estimation and makes immigrant
status significant even if it has no real explanatory power. On the other hand, in trivariate model,
common unobservable factors in the error terms of the 3 univariate regressions are controlled
through the ML estimation of correlation coefficients of error terms, thus if immigrant status has
no real explanatory power, it won’t be significant even if it is highly correlated with common
unobservable factors in the error terms. In our current case with highly correlated error terms,
the trivariate estimations are more accurate. Thus we may conclude that immigrant status has a
significant and positive impact on the probability of private transfers, but no significant impact on
the level of private transfers, and infer that immigrant status is highly correlated with the common
unobservable factors.
The baseline findings from PSID on the impact of immigrant status on time contributions are
presented in Table 3 (Row C in Panels I and II). We find that, in both the univariate and the
trivariate models, immigrants status has significant and negative impacts on both incidence and
level of time contributions. Specifically, the marginal effects from the univariate probit and tobit
model indicate that immigrants are 8.6 percentage points less likely to volunteer compared to a
similar native-born household, and that volunteer hours for an immigrant household are about 46
percent lower, compared to a similar native-born household. Results from the CPS are discussed
in Subsection 5.6.4.
In sum, holding other factors constant, immigrant households are indifferent from native house-
holds in probability and level of monetary contribution, and in level of private transfers, but immi-
grant households are more likely to participate in private transfers networks. Moreover, immigrants
are significantly less likely to contribute time and have lower levels of time contributions, compared
to similar native-born households.
5.2 The Impact of Immigrant Status on Receipt of Assistance from Non-government
Sources-Results from An Univariate Model
The baseline findings from the univariate model on the impact of immigrant status on receipt of
assistance from non-government sources, including churches, community groups, and families, are
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summarized in Table 3 (Row D in Panel II). The key dependent variable is defined as follows:
whether an individual receives some type of assistance–health, housing, transportation, child care
from non-government sources, including churches, community groups, and families. We are partic-
ularly interested in immigrant-native differences in the receipt of assistance from non-government
sources, as this aspect provides a comprehensive picture of free-riding behavior.
We find that immigrants are significantly less likely to receive assistance from non-government
sources, compared to similar native-born households. Specifically, immigrant households are 0.6
percentage points less likely to receive assistance compared to a similar native-born household.
5.3 The Impact of Duration of Stay
One key question in this paper is how the voluntary contributions of immigrants evolve as they
accumulate U.S. experience, and acquire language skills, information, social norms, and processes
of their host communities.20 The main implications of the theoretical model is that for immigrant
households contribution behaviors will tend to increase and private transfers tend to decreases with
duration of stay, that is, the immigrant-native gap in contribution and transfer behaviors tend to
diminish–if differences in contributions are mainly driven by initial gaps in household and extended
family resources.21 In Table 4, we adopt flexible trivariate probit and tobit specifications in order to
examine the impact of immigrants’ duration of stay in the U.S. on monetary contributions, private
transfers and time contributions, and an univariate probit specification on the incidence of receipt
of assistance.
The results in monetary contributions from Table 4 (Panel A) show no significant difference in
the likelihood and level of monetary contributions between immigrants and native-born households
during all stages of immigrant’s duration of stay. 22
Table 4 (Panel B) allows us to examine the effects of the duration of stay on private-transfer
20We should note that there are some limitations because we rely on cross-sectional data on charitable giving.
Ideally, longitudinal data would allow us to observe a given household over time, enabling us to separately identify
the role of cohort or “time of arrival” effects and duration effects in the assimilation process.
21A large number of studies investigate the extent to which immigrants’ earnings, skill levels, and occupational
attainment converges to the native born (Borjas & Friedburg, 2006; Borjas, 1994; Borjas, 1985; Chiswick, 1978).
Chiswick (1978) estimates that the wages of the foreign born converge to the native-born wages after 15 years. Borjas
(1985) argues that the use of cross-sectional data may overstate the rate of wage assimilation.
22We also examine the inclusion of the immigrant’s length of stay (in years) in the U.S interacted with immigrant
status (results not shown). The parameter on the duration of stay variable captures how an additional year in the
U.S. affects the immigrant’s likelihood of giving. From our results, an additional year in the U.S. has a positive effect
on charitable giving.
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behavior. In the trivariate probit model, we note that immigrant households have a higher likelihood
of participating in private transfer networks for the first 20 years. However, for immigrants who have
been in the U.S. for 20 years or longer, the immigrant-native gap in private transfers diminishes.
In the trivariate tobit model, we note that immigrants are indifferent from natives in amounts of
private transfers at all stages of their durations.
Table 4 (Panels C) allows us to examine how duration of stay affects time contributions in
PSID. We are particularly interested in time contributions because volunteer activity tends to be
closely linked with the private provision of local public goods. The baseline results suggest that
immigrants regardless of their duration of stay are less likely to contribute time and contribute less
time compared to similar native-born households. However, in the trivarate probit specification,
we find that the impact of immigrant status on time contributions does decrease with time in
the U.S. Specifically, the magnitude and (to some extent) significance of the coefficients on the
joint terms of immigrant status and durations decrease; Immigrants with more than 20 years of
U.S. experience are not significantly different (at the 5 percent level of significance) from similar
native-born households in both incidence and levels of time contributions.
More interestingly, the impact of immigrant status on level of time contributions become in-
significant at all stages of duration after we control for the duration of stay.
Finally, Table 4 (Panel D) examines how duration of stay affects the receipt of assistance.
We find that the incidence of immigrants’ receipt of assistance increases over time. In particular,
immigrants with more than 20 years of U.S. experience are not significantly different from similar
native-born households in receipt of assistance.
To summarize, the results on the impacts of duration on transfer and contribution behaviors, and
the receipt of assistance suggest that the transfer and contribution patterns of immigrant households
tend to converge to that of the native-born, as immigrant households gain US experience. More
specifically, there are no significant differences between the immigrant and the native in all analyzed
behaviors after 20 years since the immigrant’s arrival.
5.4 The Impact of Household Characteristics
Now that we have discussed the impact of our main variables of interest—immigrant status and
duration of stay, we turn to examine how additional variables other than immigrant status impact
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transfer and contribution behaviors, and the receipt of assistance. These results are shown in
Appendix Tables 1-3.
The theoretical model provides some insights on how age, price of giving, permanent income, and
other household variables affect transfer and contribution behaviors for immigrants and native-born
households. Appendix 1 shows results from the baseline trivariate model on monetary contributions,
private transfers, and time contributions.
Consistent with other studies on monetary contributions, we find that there are significant life-
cycle effects in monetary contributions to charitable organizations. Both the incidence and levels
of monetary contributions increase with age, but eventually declines among older households.23
We also draw on the literature on voluntary contributions which emphasizes the role of the
price of giving and the role of income on monetary contributions (Clotfelter,1985). Because income
and the price of giving are measured in logs, we can interpret the coefficients on these variables
as elasticities. 24The price of monetary contributions is calculated by 1 minus the marginal tax
rate for itemizers; it is unity for non-itemizers. We calculate the marginal tax rate for itemizers
using TAXSIM version 5 (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993).25Appendix 1 also presents the full set of
regression results for the baseline trivariate model for private transfers and time contributions.
Appendix 2 presents full results from the baseline probit and tobit model for time contributions in
CPS. Appendix 3 presents full results for the receipt of assistance from non-government sources.
5.5 Robustness and Specification Checks
5.5.1 Including Alternative Income/Wealth controls
In this section, we consider an important issue that emerges from the theoretical model: the need
to take into account the resource constraints facing immigrant and native-born households. In
23One interesting implication of the theoretical model that we examine is that immigrants will increase their
monetary contributions faster than native-born households over time. When we include age and age squared interacted
with immigrant status, we do not find these interaction terms to be statistically significant for either the likelihood
or levels of monetary contributions.
24We have also considered the interaction of the price of giving and immigrant status and do not find this to have
a statistically significant impact.
25The 18 input variables used to calculate the price of giving include tax year (2000), marital status, number of
children in the family unit, number of taxpayers (head and spouse) over 65 years of age, labor income of the head,
labor income of the wife, dividend income of head and spouse, property income, pension income, gross social security
income, transfer income, rent paid, property taxes paid, itemized deductions (charitable deduction and medical
deduction), child care expense, and unemployment compensation.
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the baseline specification, we have included a measure of permanent incomes to capture wealth
and income differences between immigrant and native-born households. To examine the robustness
of the results, we introduce additional controls for wealth and annual household income in order
to ensure that our results on the impacts of immigrant status captures more than differences in
income and wealth (see Panel I in Table 5).26 We should mention that when we include controls for
yearly income and household wealth in addition to permanent income, the results on the impact
of immigrant status on monetary and time contributions, private transfers, and the receipt of
assistance are all robust to the inclusion of wealth and alternative income measures. However, with
the full control of permanent income, annual household income, and wealth, the magnitude of the
impact of immigrant status on level of monetary contributions increases and becomes statistically
significant (at the 5 percent level of significance). The results on the impact of U.S. experience are
also robust to the inclusion of wealth and alternative income measures. 27
5.5.2 Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) Model
In Panel II of Table 5, we estimate the impact of immigrant status on levels of monetary con-
tributions using Powell’s Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) regression model (Powell,
1984). The CLAD model has been regarded as a desirable alternative to Tobit and other maximum
likelihood estimation methods due to its robustness to conditional heteroskedasticity and distribu-
tional misspecification of the error term. The result on the impact of immigrant status on level of
monetary contributions is robust when we estimate it in the CLAD regression model. Specifically,
we find that immigrant status has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on the level of
charitable donations.
5.5.3 Results on Time Contributions from CPS data
The CPS data contains detailed information on time contributions and immigrant status, allowing
us to inspect the impact of immigrant status on time contributions. This serves as an important
robustness check to the PSID estimates on time contributions. As noted earlier, a low share of
26 Results are not reported here. We should note that all measures of income that we have used have a positive
impact on the incidences and levels of monetary contributions and private transfers.
27Results are not reported here. We should note that all measures of income that we have used positively impact
the incidences and levels of monetary contributions and private transfers.
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households (20%) volunteer time in both CPS and PSID. For this reason, the large samples of
immigrant and the native-born households in the CPS provide an important advantage is in the
study of time contributions.
In Panel III of Table 5, we show the main results from CPS. The first set of estimates present
the impact of immigrant status on the likelihood and the level of time contributions. The second
result is the impact of duration of stay on time contributions. The results from CPS are strikingly
similar to those from PSID and increases our confidence in the results reported earlier in the paper.
In particular, immigrant status has a negative and significant impact on both the probability and
the incidence of time contribution. Moreover, this impact decreases as the immigrant acquires
U.S. experience. Specifically, we find that sizeable immigrant-native gaps are only observed for
immigrants who have been in the U.S for less than 20 years; after this period, the differences in
time contributions are much less significant.28 We also note one difference between the results from
PSID and from CPS: the impact of immigrant status on level of time contributions is significant at
all stages of stay in CPS, but insignificant in PSID. We attribute this discrepancy to the different
treatments of error terms in the trivariate and univariate models.
5.6 The Long-Term Impact of Immigration on Transfer Behavior
From a policy viewpoint, it would be useful to consider how children of immigrants compare to third
or higher generation households in their willingness to contribute to public goods. The theoretical
model predicts that immigrant-native gaps will tend to diminish over time if gaps are induced by
wealth and extended family resources. We investigate the long-term impact of immigration on
transfer and contribution behaviors by examining second-generation immigrants. In this study, the
second-generation are defined as households where the head has at least one foreign-born parent.
The key variable of interest is second generation status, and we compared the second generation to
all other native households (third or higher generations). Immigrant households are excluded from
these regressions.
Table 6 provides empirical results from Probit and Tobit models of second generation and higher
generation of native-born households. We first discuss results from the PSID. Panel I presents the
28 In future work, we plan to exploit longitudinal data on time transfers (as this becomes available) to identify
”cohort” versus ”duration of stay” effects.
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univariate results of second generation status on transfer and contributions behaviors, and receipt
of assistance. In Panels II and III, We use trivariate and CLAD regressions to check the robustness
of the univariate results. Finally, Panel IV presents results on time contributions from CPS, and
serves as a robustness check of the corresponding results from PSID.
In general, the results from Table 6 suggest that the children of immigrants are not significantly
different in their monetary and time contributions to public goods, their private transfers, and on
their receipt of benefits from non-government sources.
6 Conclusions
Since the 1996 welfare reform, policy debates on immigration have increasingly shifted attention
from the federal government towards state, local, and non-profit institutions. In the U.S., perhaps
more than in any other industrialized nation the financing of social services, health care, higher
education, and disaster relief, and other key public goods depends heavily on private contributions
or on a mixture of public and private contributions. Under PWORA, U.S. nonprofit charitable
organizations are not legally required to verify immigration status, when they provide assistance
or when they receive voluntary contributions.
This paper examines new evidence on immigrant and native-born differences in transfer and
contribution behaviors, and in the receipt of assistance from non-government sources by using PSID
and CPS data. Taken together, the results on voluntary contributions suggest that immigrants and
their children are less likely to be a burden on host societies. There is no significant differences
between immigrants and natives in monetary contribution behavior. Moreover, compared with
similar natives, immigrants are significantly less likely to receive assistance from non-government
sources. Though immigrants are more likely to take part in the private transfer networks, are less
likely to make time contributions, and averagely provide less time contributions, these differences
diminish as their duration of stay in the U.S. increases. General speaking, there are no significant
differences between the immigrant and the native in all transfer and contribution behaviors, as well
as receipt of benefit, after the immigrant’s first 20 years of stay in the U.S.. The results are robust
to alternative income and wealth controls and specifications, and robust in different data set.
20
The above results from comparison of immigrants and natives suggest that immigrants tend
to adapt relatively quickly to U.S. institutions. The comparison between behaviors of second-
generation (children of immigrants) and higher generation households provides insights into the
long-term impact of immigration on transfer and contribution behaviors. We find no significant
differences between the children of immigrants and third or higher generations of American in their
voluntary contributions or private transfer behavior.
Beyond their role in the private provision of public goods, voluntary contributions of money
and time have emerged in the recent literature as key indicators of social capital -defined as trust,
norms, and networks that spillover to the market and state and that can improve the efficiency of
society by facilitating cooperative outcomes. With this in mind, the results on immigrant-native
differences in voluntary contributions to public goods may have implications for understanding the
impact of immigration on broader societal outcomes.
7 Appendix
In the appendix, we analyze a formal dynamic differential game between a representative immigrant
and a representative native-born household. We first setup the household’s maximization problem
with upper-index i for the immigrant household, and upper-index n for the native-born household.
In each model, we analyze the optimal charitable behavior of the objective household with respect
to the other household’s choice, and the changes over time in the immigrant-native gap in monetary
and time contributions. Finally, in the subsection of comparative statics analysis we present the
key theoretical implications of the model: (1) the immigrant-native gap in monetary contributions
is in part explained by income effect, instead of the substitution effect between contributions and
private transfers; (2) although there is not substitution effect between charitable giving and private
transfer, they are positively correlated; and (3) extended family’s wealth has positive impacts on
monetary and time contributions, but has a negative impact on private transfers.
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7.1 The Model
Because both the immigrant and the native-born households face very similar utility maximization
problems, we set up one model for both. The household’s utility maximization problem is as
follows, with upper-index j=i for the immigrant household, and upper-index j=n for the native-
born household.
max
xjt ,l
j
t ,n
j
t
gjt ,v
j
t ,e
j
t
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[U(xjt , l
j
t ; g
j
t , v
j
t ;Gt, Vt) + βUF (AF
j
t )]dt
s.t. ljt + n
j
t + v
j
t = L
A˙jt = wn
j
t + rA
j
t − xjt − (1− τ)gjt − ejt
˙
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j
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t
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t
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t
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j
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n
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29 and
Inada Condition. The state variables are Ajt and AF
j
t .The control variables are x
j
t , l
j
t , n
j
t , g
j
t , v
j
t , and
ejt . The Hamiltonian is
Hjt = U(x
j
t , l
j
t ; g
j
t , v
j
t ; g
n
t + g
i
t, v
n
t + v
i
t) + βUF (AF
j
t )
+ λjt [wL− wljt − wvjt + rAjt − xjt − (1− τ)gjt − ejt ] + δjt ejt (3)
The maximum principle conditions are:
∂Hjt
∂xjt
=
∂U
∂xjt
− λjt = 0 (4)
29Utility functions are continuously differentiable and strictly concave. Utility increases at a decreasing rate for
each argument. In addition, cross partials on utility functions are zeros.
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∂Hjt
∂ljt
=
∂U
∂ljt
− wλjt = 0 (5)
∂Hjt
∂gjt
=
∂U
∂gjt
+
∂U
∂Gt
− (1− τ)λjt = 0 (6)
∂Hjt
∂vjt
=
∂U
∂vjt
+
∂U
∂V jt
− wλjt = 0 (7)
∂Hjt
∂ejt
= δjt − λjt 6 0, ejt > 0, and
∂Hjt
∂ejt
ejt = 0 (8)
A˙jt = w(L− ljt − vjt ) + rAjt − xjt − (1− τ)gjt − ejt (9)
˙
AF
j
t = e
j
t (10)
λ˙jt = −
∂Hjt
∂Ajt
+ ρλjt = (ρ− r)λjt (11)
δ˙jt = −
∂Hjt
∂AF
j
t
+ ρδjt = ρδ
j
t − βU ′F (AF jt ) (12)
7.2 Dynamic Analysis
We begin our analysis with monetary contributions, git and g
n
t . Then we briefly conclude for v
i
t
and vnt , because the analysis is identical to that of monetary contributions. Finally we study the
private transfer, eit and e
n
t .
From (11) we get
λjt = λ
j
0e
(ρ−r)t. (13)
By substituting (13) into (6) we get
U
gjt
+ UGt = (1− τ)λj0e(ρ−r)t. (14)
By taking total derivative30 on both sides of (14) and rearranging it, we get the law of motion
for git as a function of g˙nt
g˙it =
(1− τ)λi0e(ρ−r)t(ρ− r)− UGtGt g˙nt
Ugitgit + UGtGt
, (15)
30We refer to the full derivative with respect to time as the total derivative.
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and symmetrically, the law of motion for gnt as a function of g˙it
g˙nt =
(1− τ)λn0e(ρ−r)t(ρ− r)− UGtGt g˙it
Ugnt gnt + UGtGt
. (16)
From (15) and (16), one can further get the reduced forms of law of motion of monetary
contributions for both the immigrant and the native-born household:
g˙it =
(1− τ)e(ρ−r)t(ρ− r)[(λi0 − λn0 )UGtGt + λi0Ugnt gnt ]
UGtGt(Ugitgit + Ugnt gnt ) + Ugitgit · Ugnt gnt
, (17)
g˙nt =
(1− τ)e(ρ−r)t(ρ− r)[(λn0 − λi0)UGtGt + λn0Ugitgit ]
UGtGt(Ugitgit + Ugnt gnt ) + Ugitgit · Ugnt gnt
. (18)
Note that (17) and (18) have the same numerator, which is positive. Further because ρ −
r < 0, then the signs of g˙it and g˙nt depend on the signs of (λ
i
0 − λn0 )UGtGt + λi0Ugnt gnt and (λn0 −
λi0)UGtGt+λ
n
0Ugitgit , respectively. Recall that λ is the marginal utility of wealth, and the immigrant
is assumed to have less initial wealth than the native-born does, so λi0 > λ
n
0 , then it follows that
(λi0 − λn0 )UGtGt + λi0Ugnt gnt < 0, and thus g˙it > 0.
On the other hand, the sign of (λn0 − λi0)UGtGt + λn0Ugitgit is ambiguous. However, for simpli-
fication, we may assume approximately that UGtGt = 0, because UG is expected to be very close
to 0 compared with Ug. Indeed, people contribute to public good provision mainly because of
warm-glow effect rather than expecting the increment in the public good from their contribution
will directly improve their own lives greatly; Otherwise, they would prefer to consume their con-
tributions privately, which directly increase their utility more effectively. In addition, one dollar
increment in the aggregate public goods brings almost none additional utility to a household. Sim-
ply image how little utility a household can get from sharing one dollar with, say, hundreds of other
households. The above reasonings justify the approximation that UGt = 0 and UGtGt = 0. Based
on this assumption, we get (λn0 − λi0)UGtGt + λn0Ugitgit = λn0Ugitgit < 0, and thus g˙nt > 0 as well.
Though both the immigrant and the native-born increase their monetary contributions over
time, the more important questions are the immigrant-native gap in monetary contributions and
how it develops over time. By subtracting (14) for the native-born(j = n) from (14) for the
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immigrant(j = i), we get
Ugit − Ugnt = (1− τ)e
(ρ−r)t(λi0 − λn0 ), (19)
since λi0 > λ
n
0 , Ugit − Ugnt > 0. Then because second-order cross-partials are zeros, Ug(·) is strictly
decreasing in g, thus git < g
n
t , i.e., the immigrant provides less monetary contributions than the
native-born does.
Since git < g
n
t , g˙it > 0 and
·
gnt > 0, to find out whether the immigrant-native gap in monetary
contributions (git − gnt ) diminishes over time, we only need to find out whether g˙it > g˙nt or not.
Proposition 1: A sufficient condition for diminishing immigrant-native gap in monetary contri-
butions( g˙it > g˙nt ) is that
Ugnt gnt − Ugitgit
UGtGt
> 2(1− λ
i
0
λn0
), ∀t. (20)
Proof: By subtracting (18) from (17), and by substituting (14) in, one can easily get
g˙it − g˙nt =
(ρ− r)[2(Ugit − Ugnt )UGtGt + (Ugit + UGt)Ugnt gnt − (Ugnt + UGt)Ugitgit ]
UGtGt(Ugitgit + Ugnt gnt ) + Ugitgit · Ugnt gnt
. (21)
Since ρ− r < 0,
sgn(g˙it − g˙nt ) = sgn(Mt), (22)
where sgn(·) is the sign function, andMt = 2(Ugnt −Ugit)UGtGt+(Ugnt +UGt)Ugitgit−(Ugit+UGt)Ugnt gnt .
It is easy to verify that
Mt > 2(Ugnt − Ugit)UGtGt + (Ugnt + UGt)(Ugitgit − Ugnt gnt ). (23)
Suppose now that
Ugnt g
n
t
−U
gitg
i
t
UGtGt
> 2(1− λi0λn0 ). Then by substituting (14) into the last inequality,
and though calculation, we get 2(Ugnt − Ugit)UGtGt + (Ugnt + UGt)(Ugitgit − Ugnt gnt ) > 0. Then from
(22) and (23), we know g˙it − g˙nt > 0. This completes the proof. ¤
Notice that the right hand side of (20) is a constant pre-determined by the immigrant’s and the
native-born’s initial wealth. Proposition 1 tells us that as long as
Ugnt g
n
t
−U
gitg
i
t
UGtGt
is above the fixed
level pre-determined by both households’ initial wealth, the immigrant-native gap in monetary
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contributions diminishes over time.
Proposition 1 provides a complicated sufficient condition for diminishing immigrant-native gap
in monetary contributions. To find other sufficient conditions which are more intuitive and more
understandable, we may again assume that UGt = 0 and UGtGt = 0. In this case, (17) and (18) are
simplified to be
g˙it =
(1− τ)e(ρ−r)t(ρ− r)λi0
Ugitgit
, (24)
g˙nt =
(1− τ)e(ρ−r)t(ρ− r)λn0
Ugnt gnt
. (25)
Proposition 2: Another sufficient condition for diminishing immigrant-native gap in monetary
contributions( g˙it > g˙nt ) is that
Ugitgit >
λi0
λn0
Ugnt gnt or
Ugitgit
Ugnt gnt
<
λi0
λn0
, ∀t > 0. (26)
Proof: The result is obvious from (24) and (25). ¤
Recall that Ugg is the decreasing speed of marginal utility of warm-glow effect from monetary
contributions. Intuitively, (26) tell us that the immigrant-native gap in monetary contributions
diminishes, as long as the decreasing speed of marginal utility of monetary contributions for the
immigrant does not exceed a fixed multiple of the speed for the native-born household.
Corollary 1: Each of the followings is a sufficient condition for diminishing immigrant-native gap
in monetary contributions over time:
(i) Uggg(·) ≤ 0.
(ii) Uggg(·) > 0,
( U
gi0g
i
0
Ugn0 g
n
0
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
and Ugggg(·) ≤ 0.
Proof:Our strategy is to prove that each condition is sufficient for (26) to be hold.
The sufficiency of Condition (i) is easy to prove, since λ
i
0
λn0
> 1.
To prove sufficiency of Condition (ii), we first prove that Uggg(·) > 0 and
( U
gitg
i
t
Ugnt g
n
t
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
∀t ≥ 0,
is a sufficient condition for (26), then we prove that
( U
gi0g
i
0
Ugn0 g
n
0
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
and Ugggg(·) ≤ 0 guarantee
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that
( U
gitg
i
t
Ugnt g
n
t
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
, ∀t ≥ 0.
Firstly, Suppose Uggg(·) > 0 and
( U
gitg
i
t
Ugnt g
n
t
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
, ∀t ≥ 0. Then because Ugg(·) < 0 and git < gnt ,
we get 1 <
U
gitg
i
t
Ugnt g
n
t
<
( U
gitg
i
t
Ugnt g
n
t
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
, ∀t ≥ 0. That is, (26) is satisfied.
Secondly, suppose Ugggg(·) ≤ 0 and
( U
gi0g
i
0
Ugn0 g
n
0
)2 ≤ λio
λi0
. Then one can verify that
U
gi0g
i
0g
i
0
λi0
(U
gi0g
i
0
)2
≥
Ugn0 g
n
0 g
n
0
λn0
(Ugn0 g
n
0
)2
, which is equivalent to
˙U
gi0g
i
0
|U
gi0g
i
0
| ≥
˙Ugn0 gn0
|Ugn0 gn0 |
. That is, the percentage increment of |Ugitgit |
is greater than the percentage increment of |Ugnt gnt | at t = 0. This guarantees that for ² → 0+,( U
gi²g
i
²
Ugn² gn²
)2 ≤ ( Ugi0gi0Ugn0 gn0 )2 < λi0λn0 . By iterating forward, we get ( UgitgitUgnt gnt )2 ≤ ( Ugi0gi0Ugn0 gn0 )2 < λi0λn0 , ∀t ≥ 0. ¤
Condition (i) is simpler and neater than Condition (ii), yet less desirable, because Uggg(·) ≤ 0
implies IARA, and the only common utility function satisfying Uggg(·) ≤ 0 is the quadratic utility
function. On the other hand, Condition (ii) is more desirable, because it allows CARA, DARA,
and CIES utility functions.
From the analysis above, we can conclude that the immigrant provides less monetary contri-
bution than the native-born does, however, both the immigrant and the native-born households
increase their monetary contributions over time. Moreover, the immigrant-native gap in monetary
contributions diminishes in time if
Ugnt g
n
t
−U
gitg
i
t
UGtGt
> 2(1− λi0λn0 ), or if Ugitgit >
λi0
λn0
Ugnt gnt . In particular, if
the household’s utility in the warm-glow effect of monetary contributions satisfies either condition
in Corrolary 1, the immigrant-native gap in monetary contributions diminishes over time.
The analysis for time contributions is identical to the above analysis for monetary contributions,
except that we replace git with v
i
t, g
n
t with v
n
t , Gtwith Vt and 1 − τ with w. We can conclude for
the time contributions that the immigrant-native gap in time contributions is negative, i.e., the
immigrant provides less time contributions compared to the native-born. However, both immigrant
and native-born households increase their time contributions over time. Moreover, the immigrant-
native gap in time contributions diminishes in time if
Uvnt v
n
t
−U
vitv
i
t
UVtVt
> 2(1 − λi0λn0 ). In perticular, if
the household’s utility in the warm-glow effect of time contributions satisfies either condition in
modified Corrolary 1, then the immigrant-native gap in time contributions diminishes over time.
Now we turn to analyze the private transfers, eit and e
n
t . We concentrate on the case when both
households provide positive private transfers(ejt > 0). From (8) we know δ
j
t = λ
j
t and δ˙
j
t = λ˙
j
t . By
substituting (11) and (12) into the last equation we get AF
j
t = U
′−1
F (
r
βλ
j
t ), where U
′−1
F (·) is the
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inverse function of U ′F (·). Then by taking total derivative on both sides of last equation, we get
the policy function for private transfer ejt (when e
j
t > 0)
ejt =
˙
AjF t =
r(ρ− r)λjt
βU ′′F (AF
j
t )
. (27)
In addition, from (11), (12), and the fact that δ˙jt = λ˙
j
t and δ
j
t = λ
j
t , we get
λjt =
βU ′F (AF
j
t )
r
. (28)
By substituting (28) into (27) we get
ejt =
(ρ− r)U ′F (AF jt )
U ′′F (AF
j
t )
= (ρ− r)R(AF jt ), (29)
where R(AF
j
t ) =
U ′F (AF
j
t )
U ′′F (AF
j
t )
.
Proposition 3:
If R′(A) ≥ 0 on A ∈ R+, then eit ≥ ent ,∀t ≥ 0 (i.e., the immigrant has no less private transfers
than the native-born has at any time t.)
If R′(A) > 0 on A ∈ R+, then eit > ent ,∀t ≥ 0.(i.e., the immigrant has strictly more private
transfers than the native-born has at any time t.)
Proof: To prove the first statement, suppose R′(A) ≥ 0. Then to prove eit ≥ ent ,∀t ≥ 0, we
only need to show that AiF t ≤ AnFt,∀t ≥ 0. Recall that AiF t − AnFt is a continuous function in t,
and AiF0 − AnF0 < 0. Then suppose for contradiction that ∃τ > 0, such that AiFτ − AnFτ > 0. By
intermediate value theorem, it must be true that ∃s < τ such that AiFs−AnFs = 0. However, when
AiFs − AnFs = 0, by (29) we know eis = ens , thus ˙AF it = ˙AF nt , and AiF t = AnFt,∀t ≥ s. This is a
contradiction. So AiF t ≤ AnFt,∀t ≥ 0, as required.
To prove the second statement, suppose that R′(A) > 0. Then to prove eit > ent ,∀t ≥ 0, we only
need to show that AiF t < A
n
Ft,∀t ≥ 0. Because we have proved in above that AiF t ≤ AnFt,∀t ≥ 0,
we only need to prove that AiF t 6= AnFt,∀t ≥ 0. Suppose for contradiction that ∃t s.t. AiF t = AnFt,
then by (29), eit = e
n
t ; However, in (27), because λ
i
t 6= λnt , if AiF t = AnFt, it follows that eit 6= ent .
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This is a contradiction, so AiF t 6= AnFt, and AiF t < AnFt,∀t ≥ 0, as required. ¤
Proposition 4: The necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing/constant/increasing private
transfers (e˙jt < 0 / = 0 / > 0) is that R
′(A) > 0/ = 0/ < 0.
Proof: By taking total derivative on both sides of the (29), we get
e˙jt = (ρ− r)R′(AF jt ) ˙AF jt = (ρ− r)R′(AF jt )ejt . (30)
Because ρ− r < 0, the results are obvious from (30).¤
Proposition 5: If R′(A) ≥ 0 (R′(A) > 0) on A ∈ R+, A sufficient condition for decreasing
immigrant-native gap in private transfers over time(e˙it < e˙nt ,∀t ≥ 0) is that R′′(A) < 0
(
R′′(A) ≤ 0)
on A ∈ R+.
Proof:If R′(A) ≥ 0 on A ∈ R+, it follows From Proposition 3 that eit ≥ ent ,∀t ≥ 0. Then sup-
pose R′′(A) < 0 on A ∈ R+. Because AF it < AF nt ,∀t ≥ 0, it follows thatR′(AF it) > R′(AF nt ),∀t ≥ 0.
Then from (30), it follows that e˙it < e˙nt ,∀t ≥ 0.
Similarly, we can prove the sufficiency of the condition in parenthesis. ¤
Combining Propositions 2, 3, and 4, we may conclude that if household’s preference on extended
family’s wealth
(
UF (·)
)
satisfies the condition that R′(A) > 0 and R′′(A) ≤ 0 on A ∈ R+, where
R(A) = U
′
F (A)
U ′′F (A)
, then the immigrant provides more private transfers than the native-born does over
time; private transfers decrease over time for both the immigrant and the native-born households;
and the immigrant-native gap in private transfers diminishes over time.
7.3 Comparative Statics Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between private transfers and monetary contri-
butions:
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From (10), we know AjF t = A
j
F0 +
∫ t
0 e
j
tdt. By substituting the this equality into (29) we get
ejt =
(ρ− r)U ′F (AF j0 +
∫ t
0 e
j
tdt)
U ′′F (AF
j
0 +
∫ t
0 e
j
tdt)
(31)
It is clear from (31) that private transfer at any time is pre-determined by parameters ρ, r,
and AF
j
0, and is thus independent of the price of charitable giving 1− τ , implying that the private
transfer is neither a complement nor a substitute to the charitable giving. This implication is
consistent with our empirical result in Section 3 that the impact of price of giving on private
transfers is insignificant. Moreover, this result, together with results from the dynamic analysis of
monetary contributions, suggests that the differences in charitable giving between the immigrant
and the native-born is partially caused by the income effect (the immigrant have less initial wealth
than the native-born does) instead of the substitution effect between charitable giving and private
transfer.
Although there is no substitution effect between charitable giving and private transfers, we
should note that charitable giving and private transfer are not independent of each other. In
general, both are correlated with the time discount factor ρ, the interest rate r, and the extended
family’s wealth AF
j
t . For example, in (31) private transfers decrease with ρ, and increase with r; on
the other hand, it is obvious from (14) that monetary contributions also decrease in ρ, and increase
in r. Taken together, private transfers could be positively correlated with monetary contributions
through the effects of ρ and r. This result would predict a significant positive correlation between
error terms for monetary contributions and private transfers in multivariate probit and tobit models.
How do extended family resources, AF
j
t affect monetary contributions and private transfers?
We observe from (14) that monetary(as well as time) contributions decrease with λjt ; on the other
hand, from (28) it is clear that λjt decreases with AF
j
t . Taken together, AF
j
t has a positive impact
on monetary(time) contributions. The relationship between extended family’s wealth AF
j
t and
private transfers ejt , however, is more ambiguous, and depends on certain properties of the utility
function on extended family’s wealth. However, we know from Propositions 2 and 3 that under
the assumption that R′(A) > 0 on A ∈ R+, extended family’s wealth has negative effect on
private transfers. This is because lower/higher extended family’s wealth causes higher/lower private
transfers, both initially and over time.
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